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California Penal Code Section 647(e): A
Constitutional Analysis of the Law of
Vagrancy
By Lois M. Keenan*

Two police officers patrolling an area with a high incidence of
drug traffic saw two men walking in opposite directions in an alley.
The officers stopped one of the men because the situation "looked
suspicious" and because they had never seen him in that area. The
man angrily asserted that the officers had no right to stop him and
refused to identify himself. He was arrested and subsequently convicted of violating a Texas statute requiring individuals who have
been lawfully stopped by a police officer to provide the officer with
ultimately
their name and address upon request.1 The conviction
2
was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.

The above scenario occurred in Texas; yet it might have taken
place in California. The stated facts are sufficient to sustain a misdemeanor conviction of disorderly conduct under section 647(e) of
the California Penal Code.3 The offense set forth in section 647(e),
also referred to as the stop and identify statute, involves three elements: (1) loitering or wandering without apparent reason or business;4 (2) refusing to identify oneself when requested to do so by a
* B.A., 1977 University of California, Berkeley;, J.D., 1980, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law.
1. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974) states: "[A] person commits
an offense if he intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and residence address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested the
information."
2. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.,47 (1979). See notes 38-43 & accompanying text infra.
3. CAL. PEINAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970). The statute provides: "Every person who
commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor.... (e)
who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or
business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested
by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a
reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification." Id.
4. "Loitering" has been held to connote lingering for the purpose of committing a
crime when an opportunity is presented. It excludes the notion of waiting for a lawful pur[285]
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police officer;' and (3) surrounding circumstances that indicate to a
reasonable person that the public safety demands such identification. e
The breadth of the proscription of conduct in section 647(e)
raises serious constitutional questions under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause7 and the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.8 The California courts last addressed
these questions in People v. Solomon,9 in which the court of appeal
upheld section 647(e) as constitutional.1 0 Since that time, however,
stop and identify statutes in other jurisdictions have been invalidated1" under the same constitutional provisions that section
647(e) was found to satisfy by the Solomon court. This relatively
recent series of decisions raises serious doubts as to the rationale
and result in Solomon and merits a reevaluation of the application
of constitutional principles to section 647(e) by California courts.
This Note challenges the continuing viability of section 647(e)
under current constitutional standards. The Note first examines
the rationale and holding of the Solomon court.1 2 Second, it
surveys developments in other jurisdictions which raise questions
regarding the soundness of the Solomon opinion.1 8 Finally, this
Note evaluates the language of section 647(e) under constitutional
standards and concludes that the development of constitutional requirements in decisions subsequent to Solomon render section
pose. Prohibited "wandering" has similarly been interpreted as movement for evil purposes.
See People v. Caylor, 6 Cal. App. 3d 51, 56, 8.5 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501 (1970); People v. Bruno,
211 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 855, 860-61, 27 Cal. Rptr. 458, 462 (1962).
5. Although the language of the statute requires not only that one identify oneself, but
also that one account for one's presence, People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 437-38,
108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872-73 (1973), construed the statute to require only identification. See
note 36 & accompanying text infra.
6. See People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (1973);
People v. Caylor, 6 Cal. App. 3d 51, 56, 85 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500 (1970); People v. Bruno, 211
Cal. App. 2d Supp. 855, 859, 27 Cal. Rptr. 458, 460-61 (1962).
7. See notes 76-118 & accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 119-29 & accompanying text infra.
9. 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973).
10. Id. at 439, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
11. See People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 262 N.W.2d 921 (1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347
N.Y.S.2d 33, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); City of Portland v. White, 9 Or. App. 239,
495 P.2d 778 (1972). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d
104 (Fla. 1975); City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 423 P.2d 522 (1967).
12. See notes 16-36 & accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 37-74 & accompanying text infra.
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647(e) both unconstitutionally vague1 and violative of the privilege against self-incrimination. 5
People v. Solomon
The California court of appeal first upheld the constitutionality of Penal Code section 647(e) in People v. Weger.10 The court in
Weger relied on an extensive discussion of the commonly accepted
meaning of the statutory terms "loiter" and "wander," the reasonable person's understanding of the phrase "identify himself or to
account for his presence," and the degree of discretion that the
statute vested in an enforcing officer in finding that the statute was
not void for vagueness. 17 The statute also was found not to violate
the right against self-incrimination, because silence "is mere
nonassertive conduct; it is not a declaration but a failure to offer
an explanation under circumstances which call for one. '
Six years after the decision in Weger, Arnold Solomon was arrested and charged in municipal court with violating the provisions
of section 647(e). The trial court sustained Solomon's demurrer
and dismissed the cause. The appellate department of the superior
court reversed the trial court's determination and certified the
cause to the court of appeal. The court of appeal ordered the case
transferred to it so that it could reconsider the constitutionality of
section 647(e) in light of United States Supreme Court decisions
rendered subsequent to Weger.1 9 Upon reconsideration, the court
again held that the statute was not void for vagueness,2 0 but construed the statute more narrowly than it had in Weger in order to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination adequately. 1
14. See notes 76-118 & accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 119-29 & accompanying text infra.
16. 251 CaL App. 2d 584, 59 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968).
17. Id. at 589-99, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 664-72.
18. Id. at 601, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 673 (quoting People v. Wilson, 238 Cal. App. 2d 447,
456, 48 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (1965)).
19. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 431, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The Supreme Court decisions examined by the Solomon court are Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972);
Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Leary
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
20. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 435-36, 438-39, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71, 873.
21. Id. at 436-38, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871-73. See Note, Recent Cases: People v. Solomon, 14 SANA CLARA LAW. 139 (1973).
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Vagueness
In holding that section 647(e) was not unconstitutionally
vague, the court in Solomon made three determinations. First, the
court held that the statute did not lend itself to arbitrary and capricious enforcement because it becomes operative only when "the
surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable
man that the public safety demands identification. '22 The court
further noted that the relevant circumstances must be within the
knowledge of the police officer, and that the reasonableness of the
belief in the threat to public safety is subject to review by an independent trier of fact.28
Second, the court held that section 647(e) did not violate the
fourth amendment 24 prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.25 The court compared the statutory requirement that the
surrounding circumstances be such as to indicate that the public
safety demands identification with the standard set forth in Terry
v. Ohio.2 6 In Terry the Supreme Court approved a limited patdown search for weapons27 when a police officer possesses "articulable suspicion less than probable cause.128 Because Terry upheld
the more substantial intrusion upon the person incidental to a
temporary detention for purposes of a frisk, the court in Solomon
found that temporary detention followed by a request for identification also was justifiable and not violative of the fourteenth
amendment."

Finally, the court noted that before any violation of the statute could occur, a request for identification must be made. Therefore, the court reasoned, the person requested to identify himself
or herself was furnished fair and adequate notice as to what conduct was prohibited by the statute.30
22. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 435, 438-39, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871, 873.
23. Id.
24. See note 91 infra.
25. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 435-36, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. In Terry, the Court held that the fourth amendment requires that a police officer
making a detention be able to identify specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the conclusion that the individual is involved in criminal activity. Id. at 21.
28. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
29. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
30. Id. at 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871.

September 1980]

PENAL CODE SECTION 647(e)

Self-Incrimination
The Solomon court also considered whether the requirement
of section 647(e) that the suspected loiterer furnish identification
and account for his or her presence conflicted with the privilege
against self-incrimination. The court noted that the United States
Supreme Court in California v. Byerss1 had stated that
"[d]isclosure of name and address is an essentially neutral act." 2
Observing that Byers had used a balancing test in determining
whether the privilege against self-incrimination had been violated,
the Solomon court employed a similar test. Weighing the public
interest on the one hand and the individual claim to constitutional
protections on the other, the Solomon court held that the balance
fell on the side of identification." The court, however, did caution
that application of the statute in each case would depend upon the
particular fact situation involved."
The Solomon court further held that a person who has furnished suitable identification may not be arrested or prosecuted
for failing to account for his or her presence. 5 In this respect, the
court interpreted the statute more narrowly than it had in Weger.
To avoid impinging upon the privilege against self-incrimination,
the Solomon court construed the requirement that one account for
one's presence as "subordinate and adjunct to" the identification
requirement and operative only to the extent it assists in producing reliable, credible identification.3
Developments in Other Jurisdictions
Courts in several jurisdictions have considered the constitutionality of stop and identify statutes similar to section 647(e) in
recent years. These cases raise serious questions regarding the
soundness of the Solomon court's reasoning.
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court twice had the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of a stop and identify
31. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
32. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 436, 108 CaL Rptr. at 871-72 (quoting California v. Byers, 402
U.S. at 432). See also People v. Weger, 251 Cal. App. 2d 584, 599-603, 59 Cal. Rptr. 661,

672-74 (1967).
33. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 436-37, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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3 7 but both times declined
statute,
to do so. In Brown v. Texas,3 8
the Court overturned a conviction under the Texas stop and identify statute. 9 The Court did not reach the issue of the statute's
constitutionality, but found instead that police detention of the
defendant violated the fourth amendment because the officers did
not hold a reasonable belief that the defendant had engaged in
criminal conduct.'0 The Court held that the fourth amendment requires either that a seizure be based on "specific, objective facts
indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of
the particular individual,"'4 1 or that it "be carried out pursuant to a
plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.' 4 2 The stop in Brown failed to meet these requirements because, while the arresting officers were of the opinion
that the situation "looked suspicious," they were unable to point to
objective facts supporting such a conclusion.'3
In Michigan v. DeFillippo,44 decided on the same day as
Brown, the Supreme Court again avoided reaching the issue of the
constitutionality of a stop and identify statute. Instead, the Court
merely noted without further discussion that the Michigan Court
0 5
of Appeals in People v. DeFillippo
already had struck down the
8
statute on constitutional grounds. 7 The Court's decision, how-

37. Id. at 437-38, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73. At the time Weger was decided, the privilege against self-incrimination could not be violated prior to the time a person invoked its
protection. The scope of the privilege was expanded in several United States Supreme Court
cases decided subsequent to Weger which held that the mere posing of questions in certain
situations may intrude upon the privilege against self-incrimination under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968).
38. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
39. Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974). See note 1 supra.
40. 443 U.S. at 52.
41. Id. at 51.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 52. The facts of Brown are set forth in the text accompanying note 1 supra.
44. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
45. 80 Mich. App. 197, 262 N.W.2d 921 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
46. The ordinance at issue in DeFillippo was CrrY OF Dmorr CODE § 39-1-5.3 (1976),
which provided: "When a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that the behavior of
an individual warrants further investigation for criminal activity, the officer may stop and
question such person. It shall be unlawful for any person stopped pursuant to this section to
refuse to identify himself, and to produce verifiable documents or other evidence of such
identification. In the event that such person is unable to provide reasonable evidence of his
true identity the police officer may transport him to the nearest precinct in order to ascer-
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ever, may be read as an implicit approval of the determination by
the lower court.
Four grounds were offered by the Michigan court to support
its determination that the ordinance was unconstitutional. First,
the court stated that an innocent citizen cannot know when a police officer has "reasonable cause to believe that his behavior warrants further investigation for criminal activity. ' 4 8 The statute
therefore failed to provide fair notice of what conduct was forbidden. 49 Second, the court found that the ordinance encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests because it failed to specify what forms of
identification would satisfy the police officer's request 8 0 Third, the
court held that the ordinance made criminal an act which may be
innocently done, reasoning that although the police may under certain circumstances intrude on a person's privacy by stopping him
or her for questioning, the individual cannot be required to answer.5 1 Finally, the court found that enforcement of the statute
could result in seizures that did not comply with
the probable
52
cause requirement of the fourteenth amendment.
A similar stop and identify statute 3 was struck down as unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Berck." The court in Berck first found that the statute failed to
provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct because it
neither forbade any identifiable act or omission nor restricted its
operation to a particular place or a clearly defined set of circumtain his identity." Id.
47. 443 U.S. at 34. The Supreme Court nevertheless held that an arrest made in good
faith reliance on the ordinance, which at the time of the arrest had not been declared unconstitutional, was valid regardless of the subsequent judicial determination of unconstitutionality. Id. at 39-40.
48. 80 Mich. App. at 201, 262 N.W.2d at 923.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 201-02, 262 N.W.2d at 923-24. In support of this analysis, the court cited
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)
(White, J., concurring).
52. 80 Mich. App. at 202-03, 262 N.W.2d at 924.
53. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney 1970) (repealed 1978). The statute provided that a person was guilty of loitering when he or she "[Ijoiters, remains or wanders in
or about a place without apparent reason and under circumstances which justify suspicion
that he may be engaged or about to engage in crime, and, upon inquiry by a peace officer,
refuses to identify himself or fails to give a reasonably credible account of his conduct and
purposes." Id.
54. 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093
(1974).
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stances. Instead it merely indicated that a person may be held for
loitering if suspicion of criminality exists in the belief of the arresting officer. 5 Second, because the statute did not contain standards
for identifying what constitutes suspicious loitering, but left the
determination solely to the discretion of the police officer, the
court found that it encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 56 Third, the court found that by authorizing an arrest
for loitering "under circumstances which justify suspicion that [a
person] may be engaged or about to engage in crime, ' 'sv the statute
failed to satisfy the fourth amendment requirement that arrests be
made only on a showing of probable cause. 58 Finally, the court held
that the statute violated the fifth amendment by imposing penal
sanctions on persons who failed to identify themselves, or to account for their behavior. 59
In City of Portlandv. White, 0 decided one year prior to Solomon, the Oregon Court of Appeals struck down a Portland loitering ordinances' based on the Model Penal Code. 2 The ordinance
was more specific than the California statute because it set forth
criteria to be considered by a police officer in evaluating the conduct of a loiterer, including whether the actor took flight or manifestly attempted to conceal himself or herself or any object when
the officer appeared. Refusal to identify oneself was listed as only
one of the factors justifying concern for the public safety rather
55. Id. at 569-70, 300 N.E.2d at 413-14, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
56. Id. at 571-72, 300 N.E.2d at 414, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 37-38.
57. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 240.35(6) (McKinney 1970) (repealed 1978). See note 53 supra.
58. 32 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 300 N.E.2d at 414-15, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39.
59. Id. at 574, 300 N.E.2d at 415-16, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
60. 9 Or. App. 239, 495 P.2d 778 (1972).
61. PORTLAND, ORE., CODE § 14.92.045. The ordinance provided: "No person shall loiter or prowl in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law abiding persons under
circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property- in the vicinity.
Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is
warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon appearance of a police officer, refuses
to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself, or any object. Unless flight
by the person or other circumstances make it impracticable, a police officer shall prior to
any arrest for an offense under this section afford the person an opportunity to dispel any
alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. Failure of a police officer so to do shall be a defense in any
prosecution under the provisions of this section. It shall also be a defense if it appears at
trial that the explanation given by the person was true and, if believed by the police officer
at the time, would have dispelled the alarm." Id.
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). For the text of § 250.6,
see note 83 infra.
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than constituting immediate grounds for arrest, as in the California statute.6 3 Nevertheless, the court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutinally vague. The court found that the terms "loiter"
and "prowl" and the phrase "in a place, at a time, or in a manner
not usual for law-abiding persons" were so elastic that people of
ordinary intelligence were forced to guess at their meaning.e5 In
addition, the court held that the statute was void for vagueness
because it allowed an officer to make an arrest upon suspicion
alone.16
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Ecker 7
upheld the state loitering statute,68 also patterned after the Model
Penal Code.6 The court construed the phrase "under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immedi70
ate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity"
as meaning those circumstances where peace and order are
threatened or where the safety of persons or property is jeopardized.7 ' In addition, the court adopted the standard set forth in
Terry v. Ohio--which provides that "the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
63. See note 61 supra.
64. See note 61 supra.
65. 9 Or. App. at 242, 495 P.2d at 779.
66. Id. at 243, 495 P.2d at 780.
67. 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975).
68. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 856.021 (West 1976). The statute provides:
"(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner
not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and
reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such
alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself or any object. Unless flight
by the person or other circumstances makes it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall
prior to any arrest for an offense under this section, afford the person an opportunity to
dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting
him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted
of an offense under this section if the law enforcement officer did not comply with this
procedure or if it appears at trial that the explanation given by the person is true and, if
believed by the officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern."
Id.
69. See note 83 infra.
70. See note 68 supra.
71. 311 So. 2d at 109.
72. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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intrusion" 7S-as the standard applicable in determining whether a
breach of 7 the
peace was imminent or the public safety was
4
threatened.

Application of Current Constitutional Standards
to Section 647(e)
The failure to state with sufficient specificity the conduct for
which a person may be subject to penal sanctions renders that
statute void for vagueness.7 5 The vagueness doctrine may be
divided into three related concerns: protecting against arbitrary
enforcement of a statute; safeguarding constitutionally protected
rights; and providing fair notice of what a statute prohibits. 6 This
Note argues that Penal Code section 647(e) is unconstitutionally
vague in all three respects.
Arbitrary Enforcement
A statute violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment when it is so vague and indefinite as to encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.77 Accordingly, a statute
which casts a net so wide as to catch all possible offenders and
leave enforcement to the discretion of the police or to the courts is
unconstitutional."8
Section 647(e) was held not susceptible to arbitrary and dis73. Id. at 21.
74. 311 So.2d at 109.
75. The vagueness doctrine is called into play when a court, passing upon state or
federal statutes, has to determine whether the "words and phrases of the statutes are so
vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation constitutes a denial of
due process of law." Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932).
Due process is violated by a criminal statute that fails to provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that contemplated conduct is prohibited. The broad contour of
the vagueness doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more expansive discussion,
see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67
(1960); Note, Due ProcessRequirements in Statutes, 62 HARV.L. REv. 77 (1948).
76. See Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of
Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of DispleasingPolice Officers,
and the Like, 3 CRuM. L. BULL. 205, 224 (1967); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960).
77. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165 (1972); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937).
78. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-71 (1972); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937).
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criminatory enforcement by the Solomon court because it becomes
operative only when the surrounding circumstances suggest to a
reasonable person that the public safety demands such identification.79 This standard is intended to strike a balance between granting police officers complete discretion to detain any individual and
forcing them to stand idly by when they observe what appears, on
the basis of their experience, to be unlawful conduct.80 A close examination of the standard set forth in section 647(e), however,
reveals that this balancing of interests is constitutionally suspect,
and that virtually unfettered discretion has been placed in the
hands of the police in enforcing section 647(e).
Cases have defined "loitering" as lingering with the intent to
commit a crime when an opportunity is presented. Prohibited
"wandering" has been similarly defined as movement for evil purposes. Both definitions exclude the notion of a lawful purpose.81 In
some instances, the circumstances are such that an experienced police officer may easily recognize that an individual is lingering or
wandering for an unlawful purpose.8 2 In the majority of cases, however, the individual's motives are less readily apparent. Section
647(e) contains no standards for determining either the type of
conduct sufficient to indicate an unlawful purpose or the type of
circumstances relating to public safety that would justify a request
for identification. 8
79. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
80. See People v. Caylor, 6 Cal. App. 3d 51, 56, 85 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500-01 (1970);
People v. Bruno, 211 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 855, 859, 27 Cal. Rptr. 458, 461 (1962).
81. See note 4 supra.
82. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968).
83. The American Law Institute discarded a loitering provision similar to Penal Code
§ 647(e). MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961) originally provided: "A
person who loiters or wanders without apparent reason or business in a place or manner not
usual for law-abiding individuals and under circumstances which justify suspicion that he
may be engaged or about to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses the request of
a peace officer that he identify himself and give a reasonably credible account of the lawfulness of his conduct and purposes." The revised Model Penal Code loitering provision, while
it may not cure all of the constitutional defects inherent in the original provision, see, e.g.,
City of Portland v. White, 9 Or. App. 239, 495 P.2d 778 (1972), attempts to set forth the sort
of circumstances which should be considered in determining whether alarm for the public
safety is warranted. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) now reads:
"A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner not
usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of
persons or property in the vicinity. Among the circumstances which may be considered in
determining whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that the actor takes flight upon
appearance of a peace officer, refuses to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal
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Suppose, for example, that police officers stopped a person
who was not engaged in inherently suspicious conduct but was the
only person sighted in the vicinity of a home whose owner had reported a prowler. If the person explained his or her presence by
stating that he or she had been visiting a friend and was going to
work, but refused to disclose his or her identity, because section
647(e) contains no standards by which to evaluate the person's
conduct, the officers would have absolute discretion to determine
for themselves whether the person was "wandering" within the
meaning of the statute and whether the circumstances indicated a
threat to the public safety justifying a request for identification.8 4
This absolute discretion in applying the "surrounding circumstances" standard creates the potential for arbitrary and erratic
enforcement. In this respect, it is significant that comparable statutory standards in other jurisdictions have been struck down as
unconstitutional.
Section 647(e) is further susceptible to arbitrary enforcement
because it fails to specify what forms of identification are sufficient
to satisfy the statute. The Solomon court actually added to this
uncertainty by expanding the statutory requirement from mere
identification to identification that provides both a reasonable assurance of authenticity and sufficient information to permit future
communication with the person so identifying himself or herself.5
While a request for such "credible and reliable"' 5 identification
may pose little problem for people who carry drivers' licenses and
credit cards, the expanded identification requirement transforms
section 647(e) into a traditional vagrancy statute, penalizing the
status of people who are unlikely to carry such forms of identification and thus creating a status offense.
In rejecting the void for vagueness challenge to section 647(e),
himself or any object. Unless flight by the actor or other circumstances makes it impracticable, a peace officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense under this section afford the actor
an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him

to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an
offense under this section if the peace officer did not comply with the preceding sentence, or
if it appears at trial that the explanation given by the actor was true and, if believed by the
peace officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm."
84. Cf. People v. Bruno, 211 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 855, 27 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1962) (appellant identified himself, but the court held that the facts warranted a conviction on the
grounds that appellant did not adequately account for his presence).

85.

33 Cal. App. 3d at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 873.

86.

Id. at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
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the Solomon court stressed that the reasonableness of an officer's
decision that the person arrested was actually loitering and that
the public safety was thereby jeopardized by such conduct or that
suitable identification had not been produced are all decisions that
are subject to review by an independent trier of fact.87 Although
this provides a safeguard against unwarranted conviction, it affords
no insurance against arbitrary arrest or harassment. The fourth
amendment prohibits not only arbitrary conviction by the courts,
but also arbitrary enforcement by the police."" For these reasons,
section 647(e) fails to meet constitutional requirements of specificity and should be declared void on the grounds of vagueness.
Overbreadth
A statute may be unconstitutional if its sweep is unnecessarily
broad, thereby invading an area of protected rights;' a governmental purpose may not be pursued by means which infringe on fundamental personal liberties if that end can be achieved by less drastic
means.90 Among such fundamental personal rights is the right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, guaranteed
by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and
by article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.91
When a police officer accosts an individual and restricts that
92
person's freedom to walk away, the officer has seized that person;
87. Id. at 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871. Solomon assumes that the jury will determine the
validity of the detention. Generally, however, this is a question decided by the court. It is
doubtful the jury could be adequately instructed on the relevant, complex fourth amendment principles necessary to fairly judge the validity of a detention.
88. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). See also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555-58
(1968).
89. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1963). See also NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1962); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
90. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
91. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); In re Tony C.,
21 Cal. 3d 888, 892, 582 P.2d 957, 959, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1978). See generally Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67, 75-85
(1960). The fourth amendment and its counterpart in the California Constitution provide
that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 13.
92. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
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to satisfy the constitutional tests of validity, the seizure must be
reasonable."3 This "reasonableness" requirement demands that the
facts supporting an intrusion be capable of measurement against
an objective standard-"probable cause" in the case of a full arrest.94 A brief detention, however, may be justifiable in the absence
of probable cause95 if the officer has a "reasonable suspicion,"
based on objective facts, that the suspect is involved in criminal
activity.96 The reasonableness, and hence the constitutionality, of
such seizures depend on a balancing "of the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty.

'97

The requirements for a lawful investigative stop or detention
were reiterated by the Supreme Court of California in In re Tony
C.,98 where the court held:

[T]o justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances
known or apparent to the police officer must include specific and
articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur,
and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that
activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion,
but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so; the facts
must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like
position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience, to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question. The corollary to this rule, of
course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on
mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.9
Despite application of the above standards, the court of appeal in
93. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
94. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 892, 582
P.2d 957, 958-59, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 367-68 (1978).
95. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20-22, 25-26 (1968); In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 892, 582 P.2d 957, 958, 148 CaL
Rptr. 366, 367 (1978).
96. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975).
97. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 109 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
98. 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
99. Id. at 893, 582 P.2d at 961, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (citations omitted).
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Solomon held that seizures properly made pursuant to section
647(e) were constitutional. The court based its decision on Terry v.
Ohio,100 in which the United States Supreme Court approved a
limited pat-down search for weapons for the protection of an officer investigating suspicious behavior of persons reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous "when the information available
to [the officer] warrants the belief by a man of reasonable caution"
that the intrusion is appropriate.10 1 The Solomon court compared
the language of section 647(e) with language found in Terry and
held that the California statute complied with fourth'amendment
requirements.1 0 2
The Solomon court, however, merely extracted language from
Terry which was somewhat similar to that used in section 647(e).
The language relied upon is not the language of Terry which sets
forth the test for a reasonable detention under the fourth amendment. Terry does not hold that a detention is justified "when the
information available to [the police officer] warrants the belief by a
man of reasonable caution" that the intrusion is appropriate,10 3 but
that the fourth amendment requires that a police officer making a
detention "be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts," reasonably warrant the conclusion that the individual is involved in criminal activity."" Section 647(e), however, allows a police officer to
make a detention whenever "the surrounding circumstances are
such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification." Hence, the statute fails to limit detentions to those which meet the fourth amendment standards enunciated in Terry.
Similarly, section 647(e) fails to meet the fourth amendment
requirements for a reasonable detention reiterated by the California Supreme Court in In re Tony C.106 The court in Tony C. stated
that a police officer making a detention must be aware of specific
and articulable facts giving rise to suspicion that some crimerelated activity has taken place, is in progress, or is about to occur,
and that the person the officer intends to detain is involved in that
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 22, 24.
33 Cal. App. 3d at 435, 439, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71, 873.
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
392 U.S. at 21.
21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
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activity. Moreover, the facts must be such as to cause any reasonable police officer in similar circumstances to suspect the same
criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question. 0 8 The standard set forth in section 647(e) requires far less
certainty that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct than
is required under In re Tony C. For example, the fact that two
individuals are sighted alone in an alley in an area with a high
incidence of drug traffic might arguably constitute circumstances
"such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety
demands.. *. identification," but these facts do not justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct under the tests set forth in
Terry10 7 and In re Tony C.
The reasoning of the Solomon court is subject to criticism on a
second ground. As the Supreme Court has emphasized in decisions
rendered subsequent to Terry, the constitutionality of a seizure
less intrusive than traditional arrest depends not merely upon the
formulation of a standard similar to that used in Terry, but also
upon a balancing of the relevant competing social interests. 10 8 The
California statute, therefore, must be analyzed in terms of a balancing test.
The public concern advanced in section 647(e) is prevention of
crime.10 9 Specifically, the state has an interest in allowing police
officers to gather information which will aid them in detecting and
avoiding crimes. Such information includes identifying persons
suspected of engaging in criminal activity.
On the other hand, the burden placed upon individual interests is great. The surrounding circumstances standard set forth in
the statute is so vague as to allow police officers to stop innocent
individuals and, under the threat of arrest, to force them to identify themselves. The mere possibility that such identification may
prove the crucial link in a chain of evidentiary factors leading to
arrest and prosecution for crime is far outweighed by the certainty
that each request for identification constitutes a serious intrusion
on personal security. Balancing the relevant factors thus leads to
the conclusion that detentions under section 647(e) are not reason106. Id. at 893, 582 P.2d at 961, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
107. See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See notes 1-2, 38-43 & accompanying text supra.
108. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 109 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
109. See People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 436, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 872.

September 1980]

PENAL CODE SECTION 647(e)

able under the fourth amendment.
Fair Notice
Due process under the fourteenth amendment requires that
citizens be able to determine what a statute commands or forbids. 110 "No one may be required under peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." ' A
statute is unconstitutionally vague if it "fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is
112
forbidden by the statute.

The Solomon court circumvented the question of whether section 647(e) provided fair notice of prohibited conduct by stating
that an individual is notified as to what constitutes unlawful conduct by the police officer's request for identification. 1 While a citizen under some circumstances may have a duty to comply with a
police officer's request,11 ' the enforcement standard of section

647(e) is vague, susceptible of arbitrary implementation, 115 and
overbroad in that detentions may be permitted which fail to meet
the fourth amendment requirements set forth in Terry and In re
Tony C. 11 Hence, not every request for identification made pursuant to the statute is necessarily lawful. An individual has no way of
determining whether the facts within the knowledge of the police
officer justify a detention and accompanying request for identification.117 Thus, a person stopped by a police officer and asked to

identify himself or herself must either comply with the request or
face arrest without any concrete basis for determining whether a
refusal constitutes a violation of the statute. Section 647(e), therefore, is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to notify persons
110. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939).
111. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
112.

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); United States v.

Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
113. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 435, 108 Cal. Rptr."at 871.
114. For example, an individual has a duty to submit to an arrest. CAL.

§

PENAL CODE

69148 (West 1970 & Supp. 1980).

115. See notes 77-88 & accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 89-109 & accompanying text supra.
117. The "reasonable man" referred to in the statute has been held to be the police
officer. Hence, the relevant circumstances are those within the officer's knowledge. People v.
Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 871 (1973); People v. Bruno, 211 Cal.

App. 2d Supp. 855, 862, 27 Cal. Rptr. 458, 462 (1962).
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of ordinary intelligence what conduct constitutes a violation of the
statute. 118
Self-Incrimination
The Solomon court, relying on language in California v.
Byers" 9' that "[d]isclosure of name and address is an essentially
neutral act,'

120

also held that the identification requirement of sec-

tion 647(e) did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
In Byers, the Supreme Court upheld a California statute 21 that
required the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to give the
owner of any damaged property the name and address of both the
driver and the owner of the vehicle involved. 22 A major factor considered by the Court in determining that the statute did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination was that the statute
was "essentially non-criminal and regulatory" and not "directed at
a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.' 1 23 The Court recognized that compliance with the statute
might lead to prosecution for some contemporaneous or related offense, but held that this mere possibility was outweighed by the
strong public policies favoring disclosure. 2 4 It was in this context

that the Supreme Court stated that disclosure of name and address was an essentially neutral act.1 25 Section 647(e), however, is

not only a criminal statute, but also one directed at loiterers, a
"highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.' '

26

A balancing of interests in determining whether the identification
requirement of section 647(e) violates the privilege against selfincrimination therefore should not compel the same result as
reached in Byers.
A second consideration with respect to self-incrimination is
118. Cf. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970) (California abortion statute void for vagueness because, inter
alia, a physician would be required to decide at his or her peril whether an abortion was
"necessary" within the meaning of the statute).
119. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
120. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 436, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72 (citing California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
121. CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002(a)(1) (West 1971).
122. 402 U.S. at 425-27.
123. Id. at 430.
124. Id. at 431-34.
125. Id. at 432.
126. Id. at 430.

September 1980]

PENAL CODE SECTION 647(e)

that two stop and identify statutes, in addition to having been held
unconstitutional for vagueness, were struck down on the grounds
that an individual may not be compelled to identify himself or herself.127 Support for this reasoning also may be drawn from Justice
White's concurring opinion in Terry: "[T]he person stopped is not
obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to
answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.' 128 Although the Supreme
Court has never directly addressed this issue, Justice White's
statement has been cited with approval on several occasions. 29 A
court passing on the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, must
take notice that the question of whether identification may constitutionally be compelled pursuant to an officer's request has not yet
been resolved by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion
The holding of the California Court of Appeal in People v.
Solomon is unsound and should be overruled. An analysis of the
three aspects of the vagueness doctrine reveals that section 647(e)
is unconstitutionally vague in all three respects. First, the statute
contains a vague enforcement standard that encourages arbitrary
and capricious enforcement by police officers. Second, the statute
is overbroad because it permits detentions which fall short of the
fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures. Third, the statute's susceptibility to arbitrary enforcement and its overbreadth serve to deprive the individual of fair
notice of the type of conduct prohibited by the statute. In addition, the Solomon court's finding that the identification requirement of section 647(e) does not violate the privilege against selfincrimination is subject to criticism both on the grounds that the
court may not have properly balanced the relevant issues and also
on the grounds that the question of whether identification may
constitutionally be required has not yet been answered by the Supreme Court.
Should a court once again be faced with a constitutional chal127. See People v. DeFillippo, 80 Mich. App. 197, 202, 262 N.W.2d 921, 924 (1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 574, 300 N.E.2d
411, 416, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, 40, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
128. 392 U.S. at 34.
129. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 210 n.12 (1979); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969).
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lenge to the validity of section 647(e), two alternate means are
available to deal with any constitutional defect. The statute could
be construed in accordance with fourth amendment standards set
forth in Terry v. Ohio 30 and In re Tony C., 3 1 or the statute could
simply be struck down as unconstitutional. The first solution is unsatisfactory because a police officer has no readily available source
of statutory interpretation and, therefore, is likely to act in accordance with the language of the statute, rather than with a judicial
gloss placed upon that language. Hence, construction of Penal
Code section 647(e) in accordance with Terry and In re Tony C. is
unlikely to cure the constitutional defects of the statute as it is
actually applied by police officers. Accordingly, this Note advocates
that section 647(e) be struck down rather than attempting to save
it by construction.

130.
131.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).

